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Abstract 
 
The literature on technology spillovers from trade and FDI is ambiguous in its findings. This 
may in part be because of the assumption in much of the work that trade and FDI flows are 
homogeneous in their determinants and thus in their effects. We develop a taxonomy of trade 
and FDI determinants based on R&D intensity and unit labour cost differentials, and test for 
the presence of spillovers from inward investment and imports on an extensive sample of UK 
manufacturing plants. We find that both trade and FDI have measurable spillover effects, but 
the sign and extent of these effects varies depending on the technological and factor cost 
differentials between the recipient and host economies.  There is therefore an identifiable link 
between the determinants and effects of trade and FDI which the previous literature has not 
explored. 
 
 
JEL Classification: F14, F21, F23 
 
Acknowledgment: 
The authors acknowledge the support of the ESRC under award RES-000-22-0468. This 
paper was written while Jim Love was an academic visitor at CIBAM, Judge Business 
School and Visiting Fellow of Wolfson College, Cambridge.
 1
1.  Introduction 
 
The international transfer of technology is widely recognised as one of the major methods by 
which productivity, and ultimately living standards, can rise (see the survey by Keller, 2004 
and the references contained therein).  By engaging in economic activity with foreign 
partners, a country can access the R&D and related knowledge stocks of other countries (by 
accident or by design) and so benefit from those stocks of knowledge at a cost lower than 
that which would be incurred by developing the knowledge internally. This has given rise to 
both academic and policy interest in the mechanism by which such international transfers 
occur, and on the size of the growth effects which may arise from them. 
 
Linked to this, however, is the recent interest in international outsourcing, as firms seek to 
relocate production to low cost locations (see for example Hijzen et al., 2005). This is 
consistent with Feenstra and Hanson (1999), who show that outsourcing of intermediate 
inputs is associated with labour cost differences between the home and foreign country. 
Further, Marin (2006) examines what factors influence the outsourcing decision of German 
and Austrian firms, in particular considering the impacts of outsourcing to Eastern Europe 
countries. The more labour intensive the production process, the higher the probability of 
outsourcing occurring to an independent input supplier from Eastern Europe, suggesting that 
labour costs matter.  
 
Since technology can be either embodied in physical or human capital, goods or services or 
disembodied in knowledge, attention has naturally concentrated on the two main methods by 
which embodied or disembodied knowledge flows internationally: trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  There is now a substantial body of research which examines the 
importance of trade – specifically imports  – as a method of enhancing productivity through 
accessing the knowledge stocks of trading partners. While much of this suggests that imports 
do promote knowledge flows and thus growth (Coe and Helpman 1995; Lichtenberg and van 
Pottelsberghe 1998; Falvey et al 2004), other work has cast doubt on imports as a source of 
technology spillovers (Keller 1998), or suggested that trade-related spillovers are mainly 
indirect in nature (Lumengo-Neso et al 2005).  
 
The empirical work on FDI spillovers is even less consistent in its findings. While there is a 
body of evidence suggesting that there are (intra-industry) spillover effects running from 
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MNEs to host country firms, and that these effects can be substantial (see Blomström and 
Kokko (1998) for a survey), the conclusions of early cross-sectional industry-level studies 
have been questioned on econometric grounds (Görg and Strobl 2001).  More recent micro-
level panel data research has led to mixed results, with some showing evidence of positive 
horizontal spillovers (Haskel et al., 2002; Keller and Yeaple, 2003), while others show 
evidence of a negative effect of FDI on domestic productivity (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). 
Issues such as outsourcing, either through trade or FDI, cloud this issue further. For example, 
if a foreign firm is attracted to a location through low wage costs and the availability of 
unskilled labour (or location incentives), then technology flows associated with this FDI may 
be limited. Equally, should a firm in a developed country seek to source certain inputs from 
low cost locations in the form of imports, then technology flows in either direction are likely 
to be minimal. Such activities would, however,  be expected to generate productivity growth 
at home for the importing firm, resulting from the relocation of certain low value added 
activities and the simple ‘batting average’ effect.  
 
The lack of consensus on the effects of trade and FDI, and on which has the greatest spillover 
impact, is rather disturbing, especially as enormous amounts of public money are spent on 
trade promotion activities and on subsidising the FDI activities of multinational corporations.  
One possible reason for the lack of consensus is the tendency among empirical studies to 
regard all trade or FDI respectively as homogeneous in nature and thus in effect. For 
example, the dominant theoretical perspective on the determinants of FDI suggests that firms 
will use FDI as a method of entering foreign markets where they possess some knowledge-
based advantage which cannot easily be exploited by some other route such as licensing. 
While there is a large and growing literature that develops the theoretical treatment of why a 
firm should wish to undertake FDI (see for example Grünfeld and Sanna-Randaccio, 2006), 
this work generally ascribes the decision to undertake FDI as a feature of cost and technology 
differences across two countries, and subsequently ascribes certain spillover effects to this 
decision.  However, theoretical work on the motivation for FDI in the absence of an 
observable technological advantage on the part of the firm, based on the initial contributions 
of Fosfuri and Motta (1999) and Siotis (1999), has stressed technology sourcing rather than 
technology exploitation as a motivation for FDI.  This suggests that an important element in 
the internationalisation of production and R&D is not the desire to exploit existing 
technology within the firm, but to access the technology of leading edge firms within a given 
host economy.  There is empirical support for technology sourcing as a determinant of FDI 
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(Kogut and Chang, 1991; Neven and Siotis, 1996), and crucially there is now evidence that 
technology sourcing FDI has a different pattern of spillover effects on domestic industry 
from FDI motivated by technology exploiting considerations.  Specifically, technology 
exploiting FDI leads to positive domestic spillovers, while technology-sourcing FDI 
generally does not (Driffield and Love 2006; Driffield et al 2005). 
 
This suggests that linking the motivation and effect of FDI may help to explain the 
contrasting results found in recent empirical studies of FDI spillovers. In principle the same 
argument applies to trade: although imports may not be consciously technology sourcing in 
nature, it is plausible to hypothesise that trade with technologically more advanced countries 
is more likely to lead to technology spillovers than trade with technological laggards. In 
addition, imports from sources which possess labour cost advantages may have quite 
different effects on domestic productivity from those where technology is the source of 
comparative advantage. The present paper therefore considers both trade and FDI as conduits 
for technology flows within the framework of different motivational patterns, using UK 
plant-level data.  The UK is one of the most international economies in the world both in 
terms of trade and FDI, making this analysis particularly relevant. We find that both trade 
and FDI have measurable spillover effects, but the sign and extent of these effects varies 
depending on the technological and factor cost differentials between the recipient and host 
economies.  There is therefore an identifiable link between the determinants and effects of 
trade and FDI which the previous literature has not explored.  We also find that absorptive 
capacity matters for spillovers from FDI, but not from trade. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature linking 
trade and FDI to productivity levels and growth. Section 3 first highlights some factors which 
help provide an explanation for the heterogeneity in the findings of previous research on 
technological spillover effects from trade and FDI on productivity, and then outlines a 
conceptual framework that incorporates these factors as the basis for empirical analysis. 
Section 4 describes the data that are used in the empirical analysis and  discusses the 
estimation methodology employed. The results for both trade and FDI are discussed in 
Section 5, while Section 6 concludes the paper.    
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2.  Evidence on productivity growth through trade and FDI 
 
Transmission mechanisms 
Both trade and FDI are potential channels by which spillovers may occur between countries. 
Rent (or pecuniary) spillovers arise when quality improvements by a supplier are not fully 
translated into higher prices for the buyer in some market transaction, while pure knowledge 
spillovers occur when the technology of one party has efficiency-enhancing effects on 
another without any market transaction occurring.  In the case of imports, both forms of 
transmission have been hypothesised to give rise to productivity improvements in importing 
countries.  For example, Coe et al (1997) discuss four mechanisms by which trade can 
enhance growth, and these are a mixture of rent and pure spillovers: the importation of inputs 
at market prices which do not reflect their quality; imitation by technologically-inferior 
countries of goods produced by technological leaders; the more efficient employment of 
resources through learning effects; and the ability of international trading contacts to 
stimulate the development of new indigenous technologies. 
 
The theoretical base upon which the empirical international technology diffusion literature is 
built is provided by the open economy endogenous technological change models of 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). Drawing on the work of 
Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), they embed endogenous technological change 
theories into general equilibrium models to analyse the relationship between international 
trade, technological change and growth. For example, Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
identify a number of ways in which international flows of ideas and international trade in 
goods may affect long-run economic growth. One medium is through technological 
spillovers and the international transmission of knowledge which they demonstrated in a 
model with trade in both intermediate and final goods. Technology is diffused by being 
embodied in intermediate inputs: if research and development (R&D) expenditures create 
new intermediate goods that are different (horizontally differentiated inputs model) or better 
(the quality ladder model) and if these goods are exported to other economies, then the 
importing country’s productivity will increase through the R&D efforts of its trade partner 
(see Keller, 2000). Therefore, to the extent that countries that are open to trade can either 
learn more quickly how to produce these new inputs or can import them; openness will be 
positively related to total factor productivity (TFP).  
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FDI may also bring benefits to host economies through productivity spillovers from 
multinational enterprises (MNEs).  In many respects the transmission mechanisms are 
analogous to those described above for trade. First, productivity improvements may occur 
directly through backwards and forwards linkages with indigenous firms, through the 
licensing of a particular technology, through supplier networks or subcontracting 
arrangements. Secondly, rent spillovers may occur in several ways.  For example, labour 
mobility may generate technology or knowledge spillovers, as employees moving from the 
foreign-owned to the domestic sector transfer firm-specific knowledge (Blomström and 
Kokko 1998; Fosfuri et al 2001).  There is also the possibility of indirect productivity effects 
on local firms arising from foreign affiliates increasing the host country’s knowledge of and 
access to specialised intermediate inputs at prices which do not reflect fully the costs and 
benefits entailed in the production of the inputs (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996).  Finally, ‘pure’ 
knowledge spillovers may take place as knowledge generated by MNEs becomes public and 
is assimilated by the domestic sector. 
 
Empirical evidence 
The empirical evidence on spillover effects from trade begins with Coe and Helpman (1995) 
and their analysis of trade-related R&D spillovers.  By accessing the R&D stocks of other 
countries through trade, a given country can raise its level of productivity and growth above 
the level determined by its own stock of R&D.  Coe and Helpman find that for OECD 
countries over the period 1971-90 foreign R&D stocks do add to domestic productivity, and 
that this effect is both related to countries’ trade patterns and is greater the more open the 
economy.  Using a different weighting scheme to that of Coe and Helpman, Lichtenberg and 
van Pottelsberghe (1998) come to similar conclusions on the importance of imports for 
international technology spillovers, as do Falvey et al (2004). 
 
However, not everyone accepts the Coe and Helpman argument uncritically. Keller (1998) 
finds that randomly-generated trade patterns lead to results which explain more of the 
international productivity variations than the actual trade weights employed by Coe and 
Helpman, and that international spillovers are found even where no particular pattern of trade 
is incorporated in the estimations.  Keller concludes that the pattern of trade may well play a 
role in the international diffusion of technology, but that it is likely that trade-unrelated 
mechanisms (such as FDI) must play an important role. Subsequent work by Keller (1997b, 
2000) based on industry level data for industrialised countries have given partial support to 
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the import composition effect found by Coe and Helpman (1995). According to Keller, the 
composition of a country’s imports is important only when it receives a disproportionately 
high share of its imports from one country.  
 
Extensions of this approach can be found in Xu and Wang (1999), Coe et al (1997) and in 
Mayer (2001).  These studies in various ways point to the likelihood of differences in 
technology effects across industries, based on the technological capacity of the industry and 
the degree of technology embedded in the trade flows. In a further development, it has been 
suggested that trade-related spillovers are mainly indirect in nature (Lumenga-Neso et al 
2005). This research argues that imports into country A from country B give access not just 
to the R&D stocks of the trading partner, but also to all countries with which B trades, 
regardless of whether there is any direct trade between these countries and A.  Lumenga-
Neso et al find empirical support for this contention, casting further doubt on the importance 
of direct trade patterns as mechanisms for technology spillovers. 
 
With respect to FDI, there is a large body of evidence suggesting that there are (intra-
industry) spillover effects running from MNEs to domestic firms1, and that these effects can 
be substantial (Blomström and Kokko 1998).  While much of the early work was based on 
cross-sectional estimations often at a fairly aggregated level, more recent  plant-level panel 
studies have failed to agree on the existence or extent of spillovers.  Some studies show 
evidence of positive horizontal spillovers (Haskel et al 2002; Keller and Yeaple 2003), while 
others are more sceptical on both conceptual and econometric grounds (Görg and Strobl 
2001; Görg and Greenaway 2004).  The issue is further complicated by the existence of 
‘market stealing’ effects arising from MNE entry.  A technologically superior MNE may take 
market share from domestic enterprises, forcing them to produce at lower output levels with 
increased unit costs (Markusen and Venables 1999).  Where the market stealing effect 
dominates the productivity spillover effect, the result may be a net reduction in domestic 
productivity (Aitken and Harrison 1999), at least in the short run2.   
 
                                                 
1 There is also a growing literature on vertical (supply-chain) spillovers from MNEs to domestic firms (Alfaro 
and Rodríguez-Clare, 2003; Javorcik, 2004), but our concern is with horizontal spillovers. 
2 In the long run the impact of competition from MNEs on domestic productivity is likely to be positive as less 
efficient firms either become more efficient or exit  the market. The market stealing effect may, of course, also 
occur with imports. 
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There is a much more limited literature which considers both trade and FDI. Van 
Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg (2001) extend their earlier analysis of international trade as a 
conduit for R&D spillovers3 to consider FDI as a technology transfer mechanism.  In an 
analysis of 13 industrialised countries from 1971 to 1990, they find that outward FDI makes 
a positive contribution to domestic total factor productivity through spillover effects from 
accessing the foreign R&D capital stock in target countries; by contrast, inward FDI has no 
such effect.  Van Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg therefore conclude that FDI flows are 
predominantly technology sourcing in nature, and that inward FDI is motivated principally 
by the desire to take advantage of the technological base of host countries. Hejazi and 
Safarian (1999) study both trade and FDI flows from six of the G7 countries to OECD 
countries, and find that both trade and FDI are important sources of positive productivity 
spillovers to the domestic sector, with FDI having the larger effect.  Similar results are found 
in Keller and Yeaple (2003), who study the effect of imports and inward FDI into US 
manufacturing over the period 1987 to 1996.  Again, FDI has the larger effect on domestic 
productivity, accounting for up to 11% of productivity growth in US manufacturing over this 
period. Finally, Chuang and Hsu (2004) examine trade and FDI spillovers in China’s 
manufacturing sector.  They find that both imports and inward FDI results in productivity 
spillovers to the domestic sector, but that absorptive capacity acts in different ways for the 
two transmission mechanisms. FDI spillovers are higher where the technological gap 
between Chinese and investing firms is low, as is the case for the spillover effects of imports 
from the OECD.  However, technology spillovers from imports from the Asian Tiger 
economies are higher where the technology gap with China is relatively high.  
 
3.  Linking FDI and trade determinants to spillover effects  
 
The considerable variety in the findings of the empirical studies suggests that much remains 
to be understood about trade and FDI as technology transmission mechanisms.  In the case of 
trade, much of the work on spillovers or international technology transfer is based on an 
apparent link between trade and observed productivity growth. Following Coe and Helpman 
(1995), this assumes that if a country imports goods, and then productivity rises in that 
sector, this is associated with technology transfer. However, this ignores the developing 
literature on outsourcing, which is generally associated with productivity growth. This may 
                                                 
3 Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1998). 
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occur independently of technology transfer, and rather may be a feature of the offshoring of 
low value added (labour intensive) activities, such that average productivity at home 
increases. This is discussed in a vertically organised setting by Görg and Hanley (2005), 
though not in the context of differences in, for example, factor input prices. It is reasonable to 
assume that imports from a low wage economy may have different effects at the firm level 
from imports from a high wage, high R&D country, suggesting that there is merit in 
distinguishing potential trade spillovers arising from technological and factor-cost sources 
respectively. 
 
Recent work on FDI spillovers also suggests that allowing for different motivational 
influences may help explain some of the variations in empirical findings.  There are two 
elements to this: one is technology sourcing, and the other is ‘efficiency seeking’ (i.e. 
seeking low-cost production bases through offshoring).  
 
There is increasing empirical and theoretical evidence that FDI may be motivated not by the 
desire to exploit some competitive advantage possessed by MNEs – the classic ‘ownership’ 
advantage (Dunning (1979) –  but to access the technology of host economy firms (Fosfuri 
and Motta 1999; Siotis 1999; Kogut and Chang, 1991; Neven and Siotis, 1996).  This is the 
technology sourcing hypothesis. Driffield and Love (2003) provide empirical evidence of the 
domestic-to-foreign ‘reverse spillovers’ on which the success of technology sourcing 
depends, and this in turn has led to studies examining the possibility of differential spillover 
effects arising from technology sourcing FDI. Driffield and Love (2006) draw on a panel of 
FDI flows across OECD countries and manufacturing sectors between 1984 and 1995, and 
distinguish between technology exploiting and technology sourcing FDI by using R&D 
intensity differentials between host and source sectors.  The hypothesis that the motivation 
for FDI has an effect on total factor productivity spillovers is supported: technology 
exploiting FDI has a net positive effect, while technology sourcing FDI has a net negative 
effect. 
 
The efficiency-seeking argument simply relates to the importance of factor costs as 
determinants of FDI flows.  The literature consistently shows empirically that factor cost 
differentials, and in particular unit labour cost differentials, are an important determinant of 
FDI flows, even between advanced industrialised economies (Pain, 1993; Bajo-Rubio and 
Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994; Barrell and Pain 1996).  This, too, can have implications for 
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spillovers; as Keller (2004) points out, inward FDI which is simply seeking a low-cost 
production base is unlikely to form the basis for technological spillovers to the domestic 
sector. 
 
The technology exploiting/sourcing and efficiency seeking issues are developed into a four-
type taxonomy based on technology differences and factor cost differences in Driffield and 
Love (2005a) and Driffield et al (2005), and this is employed in the empirical analysis below 
(Table 1). This is at the industry level within countries, not merely at the national level. 
Technology is measured by R&D intensity (RDI) differentials4, while costs are measured in 
terms of unit labour costs (ULC).  Type 1 and 2 FDI both have some technology sourcing 
element. Type 1 is where the host economy is more R&D intensive and has lower unit labour 
costs than the source investor (at the industry level). This implies inward investment which 
may be motivated by technology sourcing and has the additional advantage of exploiting the 
host’s locational advantage (lower unit labour costs). Type 2 is ‘pure’ technology sourcing 
investment, attracted by the host’s higher R&D intensity despite its higher unit labour costs. 
Types 3 and 4 both have technology exploitation, which is the traditional ownership 
advantage, as the key determinant. Type 3 has the additional locational advantage of lower 
host unit labour costs, suggesting an ‘efficiency seeking’ motivation (Dunning, 1998). The 
final Type (4) is the ‘pure’ ownership advantage motivation, where source-country R&D 
intensity is greater than that of the corresponding host sector and FDI occurs despite the host 
sector having higher unit labour costs.  
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of FDI/Trade Types 
Type 1 FDI /Trade RDIHOST>RDISOURCE  and ULCHOST< ULCSOURCE   
Type 2 FDI/Trade RDIHOST>RDISOURCE  and ULCHOST> ULCSOURCE   
Type 3 FDI /Trade RDIHOST<RDISOURCE  and ULCHOST< ULCSOURCE  
Type 4 FDI /Trade RDIHOST<RDISOURCE  and ULCHOST> ULCSOURCE  
 
In terms of the taxonomy developed above, where the source industry is more 
technologically advanced than that in the UK (i.e. Types 3 and 4) we would expect to find 
positive net effects on domestic productivity, as long as any technological spilllover effects 
are not offset by market stealing effects. By contrast  technology sourcing FDI (Types 1 and 
                                                 
4 There are numerous measures of R&D intensity, such as the share of total national R&D, or the share of 
worldwide industry level R&D. However, as we wish to compare international R&D intensities at the sectoral 
level, we use R&D as a proportion of value added, in order to remove simple size effects.  
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2) is unlikely to result in productivity spillovers, and it is also less likely to generate 
competition effects, and for the same reason; technology laggards are in a relatively poor 
position to compete in international markets,  unless (as in the case of Type 1 FDI) access to 
lower host country labour costs provides  some basis on which to compete. 
 
By analogy, these various effects may apply also to trade, although there is some difference 
with respect to the anticipated spillover effects.  Seen from the perspective of the importing 
country, it is plausible to hypothesise that (as with FDI) trade with technologically more 
advanced countries is more likely to lead to technology spillovers than trade with (relative) 
technological laggards i.e. Types 3 and 4 are theoretically the most likely to generate positive 
technology transfer effects.  However, the labour cost motivations must also be taken into 
account. Lower labour costs in the exporting country can be a source of motivation for trade, 
which may or may not lead in turn to productivity spillovers (in the importing country) 
depending on whether the exporting country is more (Type 4) or less (Type 2) 
technologically advanced than the importing  economy. Such imports may also have an 
indirect effect on the domestic productivity of the importing economy through competition 
effects.  In the short run, this may have a negative effect on domestic productivity as 
domestic producers lose market share and produce a lower volume of output at higher 
average cost.5  In the longer run, the competition effect may have positive productivity 
effects as the least productive domestic producers either become more efficient or exit the 
market. 
 
Imports of Type 1 are therefore intuitively likely to be the smallest group, as they suggest 
that the exporting country is both a technological laggard and has higher labour costs. As 
such, imports from such countries/sectors are likely to occur only in specialised sub-sectors. 
Imports of Type 2 are stimulated by labour costs differences. In a UK context, this became 
more important over the period of analysis as trade with South East Asia and China 
increased. Imports of Type 3 are generated through some technological advantage that is 
sufficiently large to overcome cost disadvantages, while in the case of Type 4 imports the 
exporting country has both a technological and labour cost advantage over the importing 
economy.  In principle, one would therefore expect Type 4 imports to dominate. 
 
                                                 
5 Aitken and Harrison (1999) outline such a scenario of ‘market stealing’ in the context of FDI. 
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4. Data, Model Specification and Estimation Methodology 
 
4.1  Data  
 All of the data for this study, with the exception of the data on trade and FDI, are taken from 
the Annual Respondents Database (ARD) which is housed at the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS). The ARD contains micro-level data on among other things gross output, 
employment, investment and intermediate goods expenditure, collected by the ONS from its 
mandatory annual survey of UK businesses known as the Annual Census of Production until 
1998, and now the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI).  Detailed descriptions of these data are 
provided by Oulton (1997), Barnes and Martin (2002) and Harris (2002) among others, and  
further discussion of the ARD data is provided in the data appendix. 
 
The trade and FDI data employed in the estimation represent a panel of 13 countries, 11 
manufacturing sectors and 9 years (1987-95).   Details of the countries and sectors are shown 
in the Appendix. The countries include all of the major trading partners and direct investors 
in the UK and in the OECD generally.  The manufacturing sectors are at the two digit level, 
the lowest level of aggregation compatible with combining Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) and OECD data for the relevant countries.  Import data were taken from the UK 
Official Trade Statistics, and data for FDI inflows were provided by ONS. Data on R&D 
intensities and unit labour cost were derived from the OECD’s ANBERD and STAN 
databases, for R&D expenditure and value added respectively6.  The trade and FDI data (both 
as a homogenous block as well as the different types) were merged with the ARD plant level 
data at the 3-digit industry level for the manufacturing sector to undertake our analysis of the 
effects of imports and inward FDI on domestic productivity.   
 
Table 2 illustrates the sectoral breakdown of both inward FDI and imports into the UK over 
the period 1987-95. The first point to note is that the distributions of imports and inward 
investment are remarkably similar across the four groups. This reflects that fact that, in terms 
of both trade and FDI, the main partners of the UK are those who have higher R&D 
intensities than the UK; over 70% of imports and 75% of inward investment falls into this 
category (Types 3 and 4).  This would suggest that both trade and FDI may indeed be 
                                                 
6 The breadth of the sectors is due to the need to find suitable deflators and PPP currency data at the sectoral 
level, in order to compare R&D intensity and unit labour costs consistently across countries. 
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vehicles for technology transfer into the UK, as such a high proportion originates from 
relatively R&D intensive countries. But it is also true that the UK attracts a significant 
amount of inward investment from countries with higher unit labour costs in the relevant 
sectors7, and that almost 20% of imports are stimulated solely by cost differences (i.e. Type 2 
imports, where the UK is more R&D intensive and has higher costs). This is indicative of 
outsourcing, especially in sectors such as paper and printing, and mechanical and electrical 
engineering, all of which have significant amounts of imports in Type 2. Such trade is 
unlikely to stimulate technology transfer, but may generate productivity growth in the UK 
through outsourcing.  
 
(Table 2 here) 
 
4.2 Model Specification and Estimation  
There are essentially two possible approaches to estimating externalities in total factor 
productivity (TFP). The first possibility is to employ a ‘two step’ method in which one first 
obtains an estimate of total factor productivity as a residual as shown in the Equation (1) 
following the estimation of a production function.  
 
itKitLitit KLQTFP lnˆlnˆln         (1) 
 
where Q, L and K represent output, labour and capital of the firm, and the estimates of the   
terms are derived either through estimation or (more commonly) simply from the relative 
factor shares of the two inputs. The estimate of total factor productivity can then be regressed 
against the externality terms within a fixed effects model, including a time trend (or 
alternative measure of exogenous technical progress) and other explanatory variables. This 
approach can, however, generate biased results.  This can arise firstly because, particularly 
where the   terms are derived through factor shares, the two-step approach does not test for 
the appropriate specification of the production function. Perhaps more importantly, such an 
approach does not allow for endogeneity of capital or labour, and this has been shown to 
perform poorly, especially where capital is proxied by some perpetual inventory method. For 
further discussion see Griliches and Mairesse (1995).  
 
                                                 
7 One third of inward investment falls into this category (i.e. Types 1 and 3). 
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To determine whether there are technological externalities accruing to domestic plants from 
FDI and trade, we employ a production function for domestic plants augmented to include 
the externality terms along with other controls factors. In this augmented production function 
the non-input factors capture the impact on TFP. This approach has its genesis in the seminal 
paper by Griliches (1992), who postulates an augmented production function including both 
internal and external factors of production. The presence of such external influences on the 
firm is the consequence of externalities in production, due to formal or informal linkages 
between firms. The specification is thus: 
 
ititit
r
p pit
U
itit
S
itit ZXMLLKQ    14321 lnlnlnlnln  (2) 
 
where K , SL , UL and M are the factor inputs capital, skilled and unskilled labour and 
materials respectively. X  is the vector of r externality terms, which is linked (usually 
positively) to total factor productivity and Z is a vector of other controls hypothesised to 
impact on TFP growth. i represents plant , t is time and   the difference operator. We also 
include a full set of industry, regional and time dummies which control for unobservables 
that may drive changes in our variables of interest. That is,  itrtiit u   where 
itu  are the random errors, assumed to be iid  20 u, 8.  
 
The gross output and material inputs data were deflated using 4 digit producer price and 
material indices respectively. Capital stock data also were constructed ‘in house’ by ONS 
officials, using data on investment (plant and machinery, buildings and vehicles) obtained 
from the ABI, based on the methodology employed in Martin (2002). With respect to the 
trade and FDI data, all monetary values were converted to real terms using sectoral level 
producer price index data, and purchasing power parity data where appropriate for 
international comparison. Crucially, this enables us to analyse trade and FDI flows in terms 
of unit labour costs and R&D intensity, not at the country level, but at the sectoral level 
between countries. 
 
 
                                                 
8 This is the standard ‘fixed effects’ model, which is well understood, and is explained for example in Baltagi 
(2002). This allows for an industry specific component, and a time specific component. The econometric 
treatment of this is discussed in the text. 
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This framework has been used to test for spillovers from FDI in the conventional sense, that 
is, the extent to which capital investment by foreign owned firms is linked to total factor 
productivity in the domestic sector. For recent examples of this literature and methodology, 
see Haskel et al. (2002), Harris (2002), Harris and Robinson (2002), Driffield (2001) and the 
earlier literature summarized in Görg and Strobl (2001).  
 
As Oulton (1997) and Driffield (2001) outline, many studies of externalities suffer from 
specification error. For example, Oulton (1996) and Basu and Fernald (1995) suggest that if 
the vector of externalities in a specification such as equation (2) contains output variables, 
then a change in aggregate demand, impacting simultaneously on internal and external 
output, may generate spurious ‘evidence’ of externalities or spillovers where none exist. This 
arises as a result of the error term in (1) being related to aggregate output growth. The 
problem of spurious externality effects can largely be alleviated by a more precise 
specification of the externality term.  
 
On both theoretical and econometric grounds, the vector of spillovers used here is lagged 
inward FDI. The theoretical justification for this, derived from the theory of the firm, is that 
technological advance (or technology new to a particular location), or the international 
transfer of firm-specific assets, is embodied in new capital investment rather than in output, 
employment, or local R&D expenditure9. Our treatment of trade data is analogous to that for 
FDI:  we employ lagged trade flows at the industry level, testing for the impact of 
international transfers of firm-specific assets embodied in trade flows on domestic growth 
rates. Econometrically, the use of lagged external investment or imports produces a tightly 
defined source of potential spillovers, so it is unlikely that the ‘spillover’ variable will be 
related to the error term in (1)10. One possible test for the appropriateness of our specification 
is to replace the investment term with the comparable value for contemporaneous output. If 
this produces no significant result, then one can be confident that any results generated using 
                                                 
9 This argument is the basis for the importance of inward capital investment (rather than employment or output) 
on a host economy, see for example Dunning (1958), Hood and Young (1979). Blomström (1986) stresses that 
it is ownership of assets that counts in FDI, not employment, while Hejazi and Safarian (1999) point out that 
employment or output measures may understate the level of FDI, because of the greater capital intensity of 
MNEs compared to indigenous enterprises. 
10 See Oulton (1996) for a full discussion of this. Empirically this can be tested for using standard 
heteroskedasticity or specification tests. 
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lagged investment are not the result of a spurious correlation. This is discussed at length in 
Driffield (2001) and the appropriate test is carried out in the econometric analysis below11.  
 
Restricting the notation to FDI for convenience, the specification that we estimate is thus: 
 
 itititit SHAREMKTHERFAGEMUitLit
SLitKitQ _lnlnlnln4ln3ln2ln1ln 765 
  itz zitz DIFDI    4 1 1ln      (3) 
 
where we envisage four possible types of inward FDI (see above and Table 1), and z=1…4.  
We therefore define the following four binary indicators:  
 
Type 1: 
   
Otherwise
ULCULC&RDIRDI
if
if
D
D FUKFUK 


0
1
1
1  
Type 2: 
   
Otherwise
ULCULC&RDIRDI
if
if
D
D FUKFUK 


0
1
2
2  
Type 3: 
   
Otherwise
ULCULC&RDIRDI
if
if
D
D FUKFUK 


0
1
3
3  
Type 4: 
   
Otherwise
ULCULC&RDIRDI
if
if
D
D FUKFUK 


0
1
4
4  
 
zD  are four binary dummy variables defined in terms of  Table 1 above, so if 1zD  then 
0z~D  where z~z  . The dummy variables are defined using RDI and ULC at period t-1. 
This means that the motivation for FDI or trade is based at t-1 and outcomes at time t, and so 
the classification of FDI/trade and its effects are non contemporaneous.  Other regressors 
included in (2) are plant age (AGE), a proxy for industry concentration as measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman  Index (HERF) and another for market share (MKT_SHARE) (see 
Appendix for details on definition and construction of variables used in this paper). Our 
priors on the latter two measures, which captures the effect of product market competition on 
domestic TFP, is for greater competition to be associated positively with TFP growth.  
 
                                                 
11 We formally test for this by substituting contemporaneous domestic output for lagged capital growth in 
estimating equation 3. This specification is rejected in all the results presented below, using standard 
specification tests. 
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With the exception of the externality variable (s), all the variables in (3) capture the activities 
of domestic plants. That is, like Haskel et al. (2002), we estimate a production function for 
domestic plants augmented by variables that capture foreign presence and other controls.12 
 
Our preferred estimator for estimating Equation (3) is the feasible efficient two-step GMM-
IV estimator.13 Our choice of estimator was informed by the fact that both the factor inputs 
and the externality variables (FDI and IMPORTS) are possibly endogenous. In the case of 
the former, the discussion in Griliches and Mairesse (1995) is instructive, while for the latter 
(FDI) one can argue that foreign firms may be attracted to industries and/or regions with high 
productivity domestic plants (Haskel et al., 2002).  Additionally, the GMM-IV estimator is 
more efficient than the conventional IV two-stage least squares estimator in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity of unknown form. If heteroscedasticity is present, then the conventional IV 
estimator although consistent, is inefficient.14 Additionally, in our estimations we allow for 
unspecified correlation of error terms within groups (i.e. plants) but not between groups. 
 
5.  Results 
5.1  FDI 
 
The GMM-IV results for the effects on domestic productivity of inward investment are 
shown in Table 3. The results for age, Herfindahl index and market share indicate that 
younger plants and those exposed to less competitive conditions tend to have higher levels of 
productivity. Column 1 shows the estimation with FDI regarded as homogeneous in its 
determinants – the standard assumption in the empirical literature.  Inward investment has a 
negative but insignificant coefficient.  The picture changes when FDI is split into its 
component determinants (column 2); there is evidence of negative productivity effects from 
Type 2 and Type 3 FDI, indicating that competition effects outweigh positive spillover 
effects under some circumstances. Additionally, unlike the results in Column 1, the Hansen J 
test of overidentification shows the set of excluded instruments to be valid since we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the regression is overidentified.  
                                                 
12 An analogous specification with imports replacing inward FDI as the externality variable was estimated 
separately due to apparent collinearity problems encountered when attempting to estimate all eight externality 
variables in a single regression. 
13 As a robustness check, we also employed alternative estimators on our specifications.  
14 It should also be noted that the problems posed by heteroscedasticity for the traditional IV estimator can only 
be partially resolved through the use of heteroscedasticity-consistent or “robust” standard errors and statistics 
(Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2003) 
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A more revealing insight into the productivity effects of FDI can be obtained by splitting the 
sample of plants into four standard technology groups based on EUROSTAT/OECD 
classification scheme15 (Table 4).  Clearly the impact of inward FDI depends not just on its 
determinants, but also on the technological profile of the sector into which the investment is 
made.  The HIGHTEC and MEDLOW groups show precisely the pattern of results which 
would be expected a priori: inward FDI from technologically more advanced sources results 
in positive domestic productivity spillovers (i.e. Types 3 and 4), while technology sourcing 
FDI (Type 2) has no effect.  Intriguingly, in both cases Type 1 FDI has a negative and 
significant coefficient, suggesting that inward investors which are less research intensive than 
their UK counterparts can compete successfully, presumably by exploiting the host 
economy’s lower unit labour costs.  By contrast, the pattern of effects for the remaining 
technology groups is quite different; the negative effects of Type 2 and 3 FDI noted in Table 
3 derive exclusively from the MEDHIGH and LOW groups, with investment in these 
categories being dominated by FDI into just two industries, chemicals and paper, printing 
and publishing. 
 
An area of increasing interest in the literature is the role of absorptive capacity in helping 
indigenous firms to capture the spillovers arising from FDI (see Girma, 2005).  One simple 
way of examining this is to split the sample into those plants below minimum efficient scale 
(MES) and those at or above MES, thereby highlighting the difference between plants which 
have sufficient scale to be technically efficient and those which do not.  This is done in Table 
5: columns 1 and 2 performs this split for the sample as a whole, while the remaining 
columns show the absorptive capacity split for each of the technology groups in turn.  The 
pattern of results in Table 5 indicates that the spillover effects of FDI – both positive and 
negative – occur overwhelmingly within plants at or above industry MES.  The only 
exception to this is within the MEDLOW technology group which shows a more evenly 
spread pattern of results.  However, in light of the failure of the instrument validity test by 
the specification shown for this technology group then one needs to be cautious in 
interpreting the results arising from it. The fact that both positive and negative effects show 
this pattern suggests not only that absorptive capacity is important in capturing the positive 
                                                 
15 The industry composition of the technology groups is as follows: HIGHTEC –  mechanical and instrument 
engineering; electrical engineering: MEDHIGH – chemicals; shipbuilding; vehicles: MEDLOW – metal 
manufacture; rubber: LOW – food, drink and tobacco: textiles etc: paper, printing and publishing; other 
manufacturing. 
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intra-industry spillovers from FDI, but also that where inward investors compete vigorously 
enough to have a market-stealing effect which offsets any positive spillovers, this 
competition takes place mainly with the larger domestic plants.  By contrast, with the 
exception of the MEDLOW sector, there is virtually no positive or negative effect from 
inward FDI among plants below industry MES: overall, domestic sub-MES plants lack 
absorptive capacity and so gain little from inward FDI, but nor do they suffer greatly in terms 
of market-stealing effects.  For these plants, incoming multinationals are largely a non-event. 
 
5.2 Trade 
 
The estimation results for trade (i.e. imports) are shown in Tables 6 to 8.  Like FDI, when 
considered as a homogeneous block imports have an insignificant effect on domestic 
productivity (Table 6 column 1), but when split into the different types, there is evidence of 
positive technological spillover effects arising from imports from more R&D intensive 
sectors (Type 4 imports).   
 
As with FDI, a much more revealing pattern of results becomes apparent when the sample is 
split into technology groups (Table 7).  The results for the HIGHTEC and MEDLOW groups 
share similar characteristics with the corresponding FDI findings, with positive spillover 
effects arising from imports from more research-intensive sources (Type 3 and, for 
HIGHTEC only, Type 4).  There is also evidence of a positive effect on domestic 
productivity in the two higher-technology groups arising from Type 2 imports i.e. imports 
from foreign sectors which are less technologically advanced but have lower unit labour 
costs than their UK counterparts.  The mechanism for productivity increases here cannot be 
technology spillovers in the conventional sense since the foreign sectors are relative 
technological laggards; instead, this effect can arise from relatively hi-tech firms in the UK 
outsourcing or offshoring16 production of relatively low value-added activities to locations 
with a (labour) cost advantage and importing the resulting output, with a corresponding rise 
in UK productivity as a result. This ‘batting average’ effect for increased domestic 
productivity is often ignored in the theoretical and empirical literature. 
 
                                                 
16 International outsourcing involves the relocation of an activity to an external supplier in another country, 
while offshoring involves relocating an activity to a foreign (cheaper) location, but within the firm, typically 
through FDI (Marin, 2006). 
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Like FDI, the results for imports show evidence of competition effects outweighing 
technological spillovers, notably in the case of the MEDHIGH group, suggesting strong 
competition from both imports and inward investors in the UK chemicals, shipbuilding and 
vehicles industries.  Surprisingly, Type 1 imports also show negative productivity effects in 
the MEDHIGH group.  It is hard to rationalise this effect, as imports in this category come 
from relatively less technology intensive sources with higher unit labour costs than the UK, 
and so the source of potential competition is unclear.  Unlike the FDI case, imports show 
identical spillover pattern across the sample when split by absorptive capacity (Table 8).  For 
this reason we do not perform the absorptive capacity split by technology group. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
The purpose of the paper is to determine the extent to which the UK gains productivity 
spillovers from imports and inward FDI.  The empirical literature provides ambiguous 
findings on the existence and extent of such spillovers, and this research suggest one possible 
reason for this.  Unlike the previous literature we neither impose an assumption of 
homogeneity of determinants in trade and FDI flows, nor do we infer motivation for trade or 
FDI from its spillover effects (c.f. van Pottelsbergh and Lichtenberg, 2001; Hejazi and Pauly; 
2003). Our results indicate that there are positive spillover effects from both imports and 
inward FDI, but that these are neither automatic nor guaranteed.  There is an identifiable link 
between the characteristics of the trade and FDI and the resulting pattern of spillovers, 
suggesting that the lack of consensus in the literature arises at least in part from failing to 
allow for the link between the determinants and effects of different types of trade and FDI 
flows.   
 
These findings provide a link between the large theoretical literature on the FDI decision and 
the applied (and somewhat atheoretical) treatment of spillovers. We have shown that 
technology and labour costs differences (both of which are highlighted in the theoretical 
literature as important determinants of FDI) play an important role in the nature of spillover 
effects, not only from FDI but also from trade. The importance of capturing ‘technology’ 
effects of trade is well understood in the applied literature on trade and growth, but the FDI 
literature has rather lagged behind in this respect. The pattern of spillover effects is broadly 
similar for trade and FDI, but there are two key differences.  First, nearly all the effects 
(positive and negative) from trade occur in the higher technology sectors, which is not the 
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case with FDI.  Second, absorptive capacity matters for FDI spillovers, but does not for trade 
spillovers.  Taken together, these findings suggest that the productivity effects of FDI are 
largely restricted to plants with high absorptive capacity, while the productivity effects of 
imports occur largely among higher-technology plants regardless of their absorptive capacity.  
 
In comparing our results with previous research it should be noted that our approach is rather 
different.  Previous studies (Coe and Helpman,1995; Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe, 
1998; van Pottelsbergh and Lichtenberg, 2001) deal with accessing the stock of R&D 
through imports or FDI by weighting domestic and foreign R&D stocks by trade or FDI 
patterns.  We deal with trade and FDI flows, but split by relative R&D intensity differentials 
(and unit labour cost differentials). While it is thus not possible to compare our results 
directly with those discussed above, some comments can be made. Firstly, like previous 
authors we find evidence of both trade and FDI acting as vehicles for international 
technology transfer. However, much of what the literature has come to describe as 
technology sourcing may have been erroneously labelled, as the observed productivity gains 
may have occurred through offshoring and its associated batting average effect, rather than 
through technology transfer. For the same reason we do not directly compare the sizes of the 
coefficient estimates on trade and FDI spillovers, as has been done in some previous 
literature.  This is because we are careful not to ascribe all effects on domestic productivity to 
technology flows: there is clear evidence in our results of outsourcing effects, notable 
through trade. 
 
There are considerable policy implications of our findings, not least because of the large 
sums of public money spent on attracting inward investment in the hope of benefiting from 
spillover effects, in addition to the direct and indirect employment benefits. Our results 
suggest that further consideration should be given to the types of inward investment that are 
provided with subsidy. This paper has highlighted the importance of the nature of the source 
country sector in determining the effects of inward investment, yet this is largely ignored by 
policy makers when allocating inward investment incentives. Driffield and Love (2005b; 
2007) discuss in some detail the patterns of FDI coming into the UK. Inward investment 
from notably the US, Germany and Switzerland, for example, is not only concentrated in the 
4th category of our classification (where the source country is more R&D intensive but also 
with higher labour costs), but is also concentrated in the high-tech and medium-high 
technology sectors. This is the FDI that generates the greatest productivity effects of inward 
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investment.  Policy makers would therefore be wise to consider attracting investment from 
such countries, and to focus on sectors such as pharmaceuticals and electronics (see Table 2), 
if the social returns to investment are to be maximised. 
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Table 2: The distribution of UK imports and inward FDI by classification across industries, 1987-95 (£m) 
 
 import1 import2 import3 import4 inward1 inward2 inward3 inward4
Food, drink, tobacco 721 7910 3422 36338 610 5027 2854 34507
Chemicals 4461 2781 42410 14374 3772 1943 35370 13650
Metal manufacturing 12 850 760 2855 10 594 634 2711
Mechanical and instrument 
manufacturing 
226 9090 10341 27093 191 6351 8624 25728
Shipbuilding 0 0 1926 0 0 0 1606 0
Vehicles 32 149 12615 16564 27 104 10521 15729
Textiles, leather, clothes 56 40 1293 2555 47 28 1079 2426
Paper, printing and publishing 13309 34588 6939 12547 11256 24165 5787 11914
Rubber 0 2045 5114 529 0 1429 4265 503
Electrical engineering 13891 7031 9670 41803 11748 4912 8065 39697
Other manufacturing 382 8336 1280 19743 323 5824 1067 18748
Total 33090 72820 95769 174401 27985 50375 79872 165613
Percentage of total 8.8% 19.3% 25.5% 46.4% 8.6% 15.6% 24.7% 51.1%
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Table 3: GMM-IV Panel Estimations - Inward FDI (1987-95) 
 
   
DK 
 
-0.090 
(-0.37) 
-0.115 
(-0.48) 
DLS 
 
0.149*** 
(9.12) 
0.148*** 
(8.88) 
DLU 
 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.006 
(-0.37) 
DMAT 
 
-0.025 
(-1.55) 
-0.026 
(-1.61) 
DAGE 
 
-0.152* 
(-1.69) 
-0.180** 
(-1.69) 
DHERF 
 
-0.457*** 
(-15.25) 
-0.450*** 
(-14.67) 
DMKT_SHARE 
 
0.853*** 
(50.43) 
0.861*** 
(50.28) 
DINWARD 
 
-0.029 
(-1.20) 
 
DINWARD1 
 
 0.034 
(0.88) 
DINWARD2 
 
 -0.006** 
(-2.06) 
DINWARD3 
 
 -0.009* 
(-1.74) 
DINWARD4 
 
 0..005 
(0.56) 
Hansen J  
2 (p-value) 
13.847 
(0.003) 
1.240 
(0.538) 
R2 
 
0.93 0.93 
# of Observations 14,027 14,027 
# of Establishments 6,385 6,385 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are robust t (z)- statistics.  
 
***  significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *  significant at 10%. 
 
All variables are growth rates (1st difference of logs). All regressions include a constant as well as region, year 
and 2 digit industry dummies.  These are not reported due to space constraints. Lagged values of FDI (at least 
two periods) are used as instruments in the estimations. 
 
Dependent variable: growth rate of real output of domestic plants 
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Table 4: GMM-IV Panel Estimates by Technology Group (1987-95) 
 
 HIGHTEC MEDHIGH MEDLOW LOW 
DK 3.050*** 
(2.65) 
-0.535 
(-1.56) 
-0.070 
(-0.20) 
0.068 
(0.22) 
DLS 0.094** 
(2.43) 
0.105*** 
(4.93) 
0.12*** 
(6.22) 
0.188*** 
(6.57) 
DLU -0.012 
(-0.24) 
-0.024 
(-1.04) 
-0.047** 
(-2.20) 
0.042 
(1.55) 
DMAT -0090 
(-1.48) 
-0.015 
(-0.64) 
0.032 
(1.17) 
-0.011 
(-0.43) 
DAGE 0.224 
(0.58) 
-0.248 
(-1.45) 
-0.161 
(-0.85) 
-0.285** 
(-1.99) 
DHERF -0.231* 
(-1.91) 
-0.344*** 
(-8.34) 
-0.728*** 
(-10.18) 
-0.537*** 
(-11.88) 
DMKT_SHARE 0.962*** 
(16.96) 
0.914*** 
(38.78) 
0.888*** 
(27.17) 
0.767*** 
(28.32) 
DINWARD1 -0.825** 
(-2.36) 
0.058* 
(1.87) 
-0.039* 
(-1.97) 
-0.051 
(-0.55) 
DINWARD2 0.014 
(0.14) 
-0.022*** 
(-3.80) 
0.006 
(1.45) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.99) 
DINWARD3 0.325*** 
(3.36) 
-0.031** 
(-2.36) 
0.019*** 
(4.68) 
-0.016* 
(-1.95) 
DINWARD4 0.336*** 
(3.06) 
-0.038*** 
(-2.63) 
0.058*** 
(5.48) 
0.034 
(0.33) 
     
Hansen J  
2 (p-value) 
2.839 
(0.829) 
0.948 
(0.622) 
10.429 
(0.108) 
19.292 
(0.000) 
R2 0.87 0.94 0.96 0.91 
# of Observations 1,606 3,816 3,138 6,205 
# of Establishments 868 1,669 1,528 2,799 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are robust z -statistics.  
 
***  significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
All variables are growth rates (1st difference of logs).  All regressions include a constant as well as region and 
year dummies. These are not reported due to space constraints. Lagged values of FDI (at least two periods) are 
used as instruments in the estimations. 
 
Dependent variable: growth rate of real output of domestic plants 
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Table 5: GMM-IV Panel Estimates by MES and Technology Group (1987-95) 
 
 Plants >= 
MES 
Plants < 
MES 
Plants >= 
MES 
HIGHTEC 
Plants < 
MES 
HIGHTEC
Plants >= MES 
MEDHIGH 
Plants < MES 
MEDHIGH 
DK 
 
-0.115 
(-0.31) 
0.213 
(0.50) 
-1.056 
(-1.15) 
-1.929 
(-1.54) 
-0.970 
(-1.17) 
0.031 
(0.07) 
DLS 
 
0.182*** 
(8.77) 
0.142*** 
(7.71) 
0.107 
(1.55) 
0.133*** 
(2.90) 
0.127*** 
(4.31) 
0.108*** 
(4.23) 
DLU 
 
0.004 
(0.21) 
0.030 
(1.42) 
-0.008 
(-0.15) 
0.086 
(1.35) 
-0.041 
(-1.20) 
0.019 
(0.68) 
DMAT 
 
0.013 
(0.58) 
0.045** 
(1.98) 
-0.134 
(-1.41) 
-0.073 
(-0.90) 
0.025 
(0.70) 
0.027 
(0.80) 
DAGE 
 
-0.154 
(-1.05) 
-0.349*** 
(-2.85) 
0.533 
(0.94) 
0.382 
(0.74) 
-0.068 
(-0.24) 
-0.435* 
(-1.76) 
DHERF 
 
-0.441*** 
(-10.91) 
-0.373*** 
(-11.06) 
-0.028 
(-0.17) 
-0.280** 
(-2.36) 
-0.330*** 
(-6.36) 
-0.308*** 
(-5.73) 
DMKT_SHARE 
 
0.775*** 
(29.39) 
0.755*** 
(27.11) 
0.962*** 
(10.74) 
0.834*** 
(12.32) 
0.864*** 
(24.01) 
0.826*** 
(22.18) 
DINWARD1 
 
0.009 
(0.14) 
0.023 
(1.17) 
-1.545*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.242 
(-0.61) 
0.067 
(1.31) 
0.036 
(1.06) 
DINWARD2 
 
-0.006 
(-1.59) 
-0.005* 
(-1.69) 
0.241 
(1.58) 
-0.134 
(-1.11) 
-0.022*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.017** 
(-2.22) 
DINWARD3 
 
-0.006 
(-0.86) 
-0.010* 
(-1.79) 
0.465*** 
(3.42) 
0.177 
(1.15) 
-0.043*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.012 
(-0.66) 
DINWARD4 
 
0..006 
(0.50) 
-0..013 
(-1.61) 
0..539*** 
(3.32) 
0.139 
(0.89) 
-0..052*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.019 
(-1.05) 
Hansen J  
2 (p-value) 
0.295 
(0.863) 
10.308 
(0.112) 
3.799 
(0.704) 
6.341 
(0.175) 
0.961 
(0.618) 
0.370 
(0.831) 
R2 
 
0.90 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.92 
# of 
Observations 
7,197 6,830 426 442 1,940 1,876 
# of 
Establishments 
4,711 4,533 304 300 1,237 1,221 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are robust z- statistics.  
 
***  significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
All variables are growth rates (1st difference of logs). All regressions include a constant as well as region and 
year dummies. Additionally, regressions 1 & 2 include 2 digit industry dummies.  These are not reported due to 
space constraints. Lagged values of FDI (at least two periods) are used as instruments in the estimations. 
 
Dependent variable: growth rate of real output of domestic plants 
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Table 5 (Cont’d): GMM-IV Panel Estimates by MES and Technology Group (1987-95) 
 
 Plants >= MES 
MEDLOW 
Plants < MES 
MEDLOW 
Plants >= MES  
LOW 
Plants < MES 
LOW 
DK 
 
-0.125 
(-0.20) 
0.241 
(0.66) 
-0.273 
(-0.73) 
0.813 
(1.36) 
DLS 
 
0.151*** 
(5.06) 
0.117*** 
(4.86) 
0.232*** 
(7.13) 
0.190*** 
(5.80) 
DLU 
 
-0.042 
(-1.30) 
-0.062** 
(-2.33) 
0.059* 
(1.82) 
0.059 
(1.50) 
DMAT 
 
0.088** 
(2.28) 
0.073* 
(1.69) 
0.057 
(1.59) 
0.056 
(1.53) 
DAGE 
 
-0.373 
(-1.25) 
0.196 
(0.86) 
-0.106 
(-0.43) 
-0.491*** 
(-2.70) 
DHERF 
 
-0.765*** 
(-8.13) 
-0.366*** 
(-5.74) 
-0.484*** 
(-8.10) 
-0.448*** 
(-7.56) 
DMKT_SHARE 
 
0.797*** 
(15.90) 
0.856*** 
(15.57) 
0.642*** 
(15.83) 
0.667*** 
(14.68) 
DINWARD1 
 
-0.042 
(-1.32) 
-0.065*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.023 
(-0.29) 
-0.077 
(-0.75) 
DINWARD2 
 
0.006 
(1.13) 
0.010** 
(1.97) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.002 
(-0.44) 
DINWARD3 
 
0.021*** 
(3.40) 
0.012** 
(2.37) 
-0.022*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.009 
(-0.82) 
DINWARD4 
 
0..049*** 
(2.79) 
0.031** 
(2.43) 
-0..201** 
(-2.22) 
0.141 
(0.92) 
Hansen J  
2 (p-value) 
3.667 
(0.722) 
20.688 
(0.002) 
13.880 
(0.001) 
5.728 
(0.057) 
R2 
 
0.93 0.95 0.88 0.87 
# of 
Observations 
1,624 1,514 3,207 2,998 
# of 
Establishments 
1,118 1,054 2,074 1,980 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are robust z- statistics.  
 
***  significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
All variables are growth rates (1st difference of logs).  All regressions include a constant as well as region and 
year dummies. These are not reported due to space constraints. Lagged values of FDI (at least two periods) are 
used as instruments in the estimations. 
 
Dependent variable: growth rate of real output of domestic plants 
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Table 6: GMM-IV Panel Estimations - Imports  (1987-95) 
 
   
DK 
 
-0.175 
(-0.37) 
-0.170 
(-0.61) 
DLS 
 
0.146*** 
(9.29) 
0.146*** 
(9.29) 
DLU 
 
-0.002 
(-0.13) 
0.002 
(0.10) 
DMAT 
 
-0.021 
(-1.37) 
-0.022 
(-1.43) 
DAGE 
 
-0.217** 
(-2.51) 
-0.225*** 
(-2.60) 
DHERF 
 
-0.507*** 
(-18.12) 
-0.507*** 
(-17.76) 
DMKT_SHARE 
 
0.854*** 
(55.92) 
0.853*** 
(55.62) 
DIMPORT 
 
-0.011 
(-0.14) 
 
DIMPORT1 
 
 -0.001 
(-1.29) 
DIMPORT2 
 
 0.031 
(1.21) 
DIMPORT3 
 
 -0.004 
(-0.66) 
DIMPORT4 
 
 0.043*** 
(2.87) 
Hansen J  
2 (p-value) 
17.480 
(0.001) 
2.020 
(0.568) 
R2 
 
0.92 0.92 
# of Observations 15,050 15,050 
# of Establishments 6,496 6,496 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are robust t (z)- statistics.  
 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
All variables are growth rates (1st difference of logs). All regressions include a constant as well as region, year 
and 2 digit industry dummies.  These are not reported due to space constraints. Lagged values of imports (at 
least one period) are used as instruments in the estimations. 
 
Dependent variable: growth rate of real output of domestic plants 
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Table 7: GMM-IV Panel Estimates by Technology Group (1987-95) 
 
 HIGHTEC MEDHIGH MEDLOW LOW 
DK 2.127 
(1.27) 
-0.389 
(-0.94) 
0.069 
(0.12) 
-0.147 
(-0.55) 
DLS 0.097*** 
(2.66) 
0.096*** 
(4.28) 
0.118*** 
(5.80) 
0.179*** 
(6.48) 
DLU -0.037 
(-0.80) 
0.009 
(0.36) 
-0.025 
(-1.13) 
0.018 
(0.67) 
DMAT -0.082 
(-1.35) 
-0.022 
(-0.86) 
0.014 
(0.56) 
-0.013 
(-0.49) 
DAGE 0.255 
(0.77) 
-0.215 
(-1.19) 
-0.080 
(-0.38) 
-0.334** 
(-2.46) 
DHERF -0.283** 
(-2.09) 
-0.408*** 
(-7.96) 
-0.698*** 
(-11.38) 
-0.619*** 
(-14.93) 
DMKT_SHARE 0.967*** 
(17.00) 
0.908*** 
(37.11) 
0.892*** 
(35.46) 
0.795*** 
(31.14) 
DIMPORT1  -0.068*** 
(-5.26) 
0.004 
(0.69) 
0.004*** 
(3.13) 
DIMPORT2 0.275*** 
(3.36) 
0.522*** 
(4.40) 
0.123 
(1.16) 
-0.073* 
(-1.73) 
DIMPORT3 0.180*** 
(4.62) 
-0.257*** 
(-4.87) 
0.034** 
(2.40) 
0.021 
(0.92) 
DIMPORT4 0.407*** 
(3.90) 
-0.220*** 
(-4.77) 
-0.013 
(-0.23) 
0.014 
(0.49) 
     
Hansen J  
2 (p-value) 
4.633 
(0.327) 
4.269 
(0.234) 
7.737 
(0.052) 
7.066 
(0.070) 
R2 0.89 0.90 0.95 0.91 
# of Observations 868 3,942 3,711 6,529 
# of Establishments 439 1,692 1,602 2,825 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are robust z -statistics.  
 
***  significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
All variables are growth rates (1st difference of logs).  All regressions include a constant as well as region and 
year dummies. These are not reported due to space constraints. Lagged values of imports (at least one period) 
are used as instruments in the estimations. 
 
Dependent variable: growth rate of real output of domestic plants 
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Table 8: GMM-IV Panel Estimates by MES (1987-95) 
 
 Plants >= MES Plants < MES 
DK 
 
-0.190 
(-0.34) 
0.060 
(0.14) 
DLS 
 
0.178*** 
(8.98) 
0.138*** 
(7.74) 
DLU 
 
0.008 
(0.40) 
0.032 
(1.55) 
DMAT 
 
0.016 
(0.71) 
0.041** 
(1.89) 
DAGE 
 
-0.177 
(-1.26) 
-0.400*** 
(-3.38) 
DHERF 
 
-0.498*** 
(-12.68) 
-0.425*** 
(-13.15) 
DMKT_SHARE 
 
0.774*** 
(32.15) 
0.762*** 
(31.06) 
DIMPORT1 
 
-0.001 
(-0.51) 
-0.001 
(-0.95) 
DIMPORT2 
 
0.043 
(1.40) 
-0.034 
(-1.02) 
DIMPORT3 
 
-0.008 
(-0.84) 
-0.007 
(-0.78) 
DIMPORT4 
 
0.046** 
(2.22) 
0.045** 
(2.19) 
Hansen J  
2 (p-value) 
0.305 
(0.959) 
9.003 
(0.029) 
R2 
 
0.89 0.90 
# of Observations 7,721 7,329 
# of Establishments 4,874 4,700 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are robust z- statistics.  
 
***  means significant at 1%; ** means significant at 5%; * means significant at 10%. 
 
All variables are growth rates (1st difference of logs). All regressions include a constant as well as region and 
year dummies. Additionally, regressions 1 & 2 include 2 digit industry dummies.  These are not reported due to 
space constraints. Lagged values of imports (at least one period) are used as instruments in the estimations. 
 
Dependent variable: growth rate of real output of domestic plants 
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Appendix: Data and Sources 
 
The Annual Respondents Database 
 
The ARD contains two files: ‘selected’ and ‘non-selected ’. The former contains detailed 
information on a sample of plants that are sent inquiry forms and respond or have their 
responses imputed, while the latter file comprises non-sampled or non-response plants for 
which only basic information such as employment, location, industry grouping and foreign 
ownership status are recorded.  In common with most users of these data, Haskel and Heden 
(1999), Girma and Wakelin (2001), Oulton (2001), we focus on “selected” establishments 
only, that is, those required by law to fill in a return for the ONS.  Data on between 14,000-
19,000 establishments across all manufacturing are provided in the selected file annually 
based on a stratified sampling methodology. These plants account for around 90% of total 
UK manufacturing. Though the sampling frame may vary from year to year, establishments 
with more than 100 employees are always sampled while smaller businesses are sampled 
randomly.   
 
In the ARD, an establishment is defined as the smallest unit which can provide the full range 
of data required for the Census questionnaire. It is possible for an establishment to consist of 
several local units which is defined as a ‘plant’ or office operating at a single mailing 
address. Because some of these offices are spread across several sites, they are not plants in 
the strict sense of the word. In about 80% of all cases however, a business unit is located 
entirely at a single mailing address (Criscuolo and Martin, 2005). Therefore, most of the data 
from the ARD used in this study are in effect plant level data. Consequently, in this paper we 
use the terms establishments and plants interchangeably. A ‘parent’ establishment reports for 
more than one plant or local unit. Thus for multi-plant establishments the data are aggregate 
values for the constituent plants.   
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Table A1:   Countries in Panel 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Canada* 
China* 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic* 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hong Kong 
Hungary* 
Iceland 
Indonesia* 
Irish Republic 
Italy 
Japan 
Malaysia 
Malta* 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Philippines* 
Poland* 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Serbia & Montenegro*
Singapore 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Thailand* 
Turkey 
USA 
Vietnam* 
 
* trade partner country only, no FDI into UK 
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Table A2.  Sectors in Panel 
 
Sectors (ISIC 3 codes) 
Food, Drink and Tobacco (15+16) 
Chemicals (24) 
Metal Manufacturing (27) 
Mechanical & Instrument Manufacturing (29+33) 
Transport Equipment exc. Vehicles (35) 
Vehicles (34) 
Textiles, Leather and Clothing (17+18+19) 
Paper, Printing and Publishing (21+22) 
Rubber & Plastics (25) 
Electrical Engineering (30+31+32) 
Other Manufacturing (20+26+28+36+37) 
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Table A3:  Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Qit Total Manufacturing Real Gross Output. 
Deflated by 4-digit producer price index. 
ONS-ARD; ONS  
Kit Real Capital stock ONS-ARD 
Lsit Employment of operatives ONS-ARD 
Luit Employment of non-operatives ONS-ARD 
MATit Materials. Real intermediate inputs deflated 
by 4-digit material price index  
ONS-ARD 
AGEit Age of plant ONS-ARD 
MKT_SHAREit Market Share. Measured as plant output as a 
share of 4-digit industry output. 
ONS-ARD 
HERFit Herfindahl-Hirschman Index..Sum of the 
squares of market shares.  
ONS-ARD 
RDit R&D expenditure ANBERD 
RDIit RD/Q ANBERD/STAN 
INWARD (1)it FDI where RDIUK>RDIF and ULCUK< ULCF  ONS/ANBERD/STAN 
INWARD (2)it FDI where RDIUK>RDIF and ULCUK> ULCF ONS/ANBERD/STAN 
INWARD (3)it FDI where RDIUK<RDIF and ULCUK< ULCF ONS/ANBERD/STAN 
INWARD (4)it FDI where RDIUK<RDIF and ULCUK> ULCF ONS/ANBERD/STAN 
IMPORT (1)it Imports where RDIUK>RDIF and ULCUK< 
ULCF   
ONS/ANBERD/STAN 
IMPORT (2)it Imports where RDIUK>RDIF and ULCUK> 
ULCF 
ONS/ANBERD/STAN 
IMPORT (3)it Imports where RDIUK<RDIF and ULCUK< 
ULCF  
ONS/ANBERD/STAN 
IMPORT (4)it Imports where RDIUK<RDIF and ULCUK> 
ULCF  
ONS/ANBERD/STAN 
MES  Minimum Efficient Scale. Log of the median 
output of industry j.  
ONS-ARD 
 
Sectoral producer price deflators and OECD purchasing power parity deflators were 
employed in calculating relative R&D intensities across countries.  All estimations carried 
out in log form.  
 
